Professor of Finance, Faculty Director Notre Dame Institute for Global Investing
Shane Corwin is a Professor in the Department of Finance and serves as the Faculty Director of the Notre Dame Institute for Global Investing. Professor Corwin received a B.S. and an MBA from Mankato State University and a Ph.D. in Finance from The Ohio State University. He was an Assistant Professor at the University of Georgia prior to joining the University of Notre Dame in the fall of 2000. Professor Corwin teaches applied investment management (AIM), security analysis, and investments at both the undergraduate and graduate level and has received several teaching awards at Notre Dame, including the James Dincolo Outstanding Undergraduate Professor Award, the Rev. Edmund P. Joyce, C.S.C. Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching, the Kaneb Teaching Award, the BP Outstanding Teacher Award, and the Chicago EMBA Outstanding Professor Award. Shane is the proud father of four children and enjoys spending time with his family. He and his family also lived in London for a semester, where he taught in Notre Dame’s London Undergraduate Program. Professor Corwin’s research focuses on security market design and investment banking. He has published articles in numerous finance journals, including the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Financial Markets, the Journal of Financial Intermediation, and Financial Management. In recent articles, he has studied the role of limited attention in securities trading, the measurement of transaction costs, conflicts of interest related to maker-taker fees on U.S. stock exchanges. Professor Corwin has also served as a member of the Nasdaq Economic Advisory Board and has been awarded research grants from the Notre Dame Deloitte Center for Ethical Leadership, Morgan Stanley, and the Q-Group.
“Investment banking relationships and analyst affiliation bias: The impact of the global settlement on sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks” with Stephannie Larocque and Mike Stegemoller, Journal of Financial Economics 2017.
We examine the impact of the Global Settlement on affiliation bias in analyst recommendations. Using a broad measure of investment bank-firm relationships, we find a substantial reduction in analyst affiliation bias following the settlement for sanctioned banks. In contrast, we find strong evidence of bias both before and after the settlement for affiliated analysts at non-sanctioned banks. Our results suggest that the settlement led to an increase in the expected costs of issuing biased coverage at sanctioned banks, while concurrent self-regulatory organization rule changes were largely ineffective at reducing the influence of investment banking on analyst research at large non-sanctioned banks.